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· Is security a public or a private good, 
or something else entirely? 
 
· If security is a public good, is the 
state the primary provider? 
 
· Who bears responsibility for the 
provision of security? 
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Who Bears 
Responsibility for the 
Provision of Security: 
The State or You? 
Summary: When defining the absence of a threat 
as an economic good, it is necessary to define this 
good  using  the  standard  economic  typology:  is 
security a private, public, club or common good? 
We  argue  in  this  Policy  Briefing  that  security 
provision can display characteristics belonging to 
any of these types of goods. In recent years, we can 
observe  a  change  from  more  publicly  oriented 
security  provision  to  privately  provided  security. 
That  does  not,  however,  take  away  the 
responsibility of the state to provide a basic level 
of  security.  In  addition  to  that,  it  is  the 
responsibility  of  the  state  to  coordinate 











While security can be defined as the absence of threats 
to  safety,  its  defining  characteristics  have  important 
implications  for  the  type  of  measures  necessary  to 
reduce it. In particular, using the broadest definition of 
security (including food security, absence of infectious 
diseases, etc.) raises the question of the provision of 
security  as  a  good.  Classical  security  (military  or 
violent threats) was typically considered to be a good 
provided by the state, but technological progress and 
changing demands for security provision have moved 
security  towards  something  purchased  by  private 
individuals as well.  
In  this  Policy  Briefing,  we  look  at  the  definition  of 
security and its categorization as either a private or 
public  good.  This  research  is  based  in  particular  on 
Engerer (2011), but it is part of a larger debate both 
within and beyond the EUSECON project. 
What types of goods actually exist? 
Generally, economists use two characteristics to define 
goods:  rivalry  and  excludability.  Rivalry  means  that 
only one (or few) individuals are able to consume a 
particular  good  and  thereby  make  it  impossible  for 
others to consume the same good. Examples of rival 
goods are food or consumer goods. Examples of non-
rival  goods  include  national  defence  and  highways. 
Excludability refers to whether or not it is feasible to 
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Security has features of private and public 
goods, as well as public and common goods 
good.  Typical  examples  of  non-excludable  goods 
include  fresh  air  and  the  services  provided  by 
lighthouses. Excludable goods include most privately 
owned  goods,  such  as  cars  or  housing.  The 
combination of these two characteristics provides four 
types  of  goods,  as  shown  in  table  1.  The  four 
categories  are  private  goods  (excludable  and  rival), 
common goods (non-excludable and rival), club goods 
(excludable  and  non-rival)  and  public  goods  (non-
excludable  and  non-rival).  However,  these  are 
obviously the most extreme cases and in reality, not all 
goods follow this division exactly. In addition, goods 
can  change  their  characteristics  through  e.g. 
technological  progress.  Before  cable  broadcasting, 
television used to be a public good and now it is a club 
good, for example. 
In theory, the supply of private goods is 
always  optimal,  thanks  to  the  free 
market.  Public  goods,  on  the  other 
hand,  cannot  be  provided  by  the  free 
market (as a result of the non-excludability) and thus 
the  state  plays  a  role  by  either  providing  the  good 
itself or by purchasing the good on the free market. 
However,  since  the  state  does  not  know  the  true 
preferences  of  the  potential  beneficiaries,  it  cannot 
calculate the actual price that society is willing to pay 
for a good. As a result, for public goods, an optimal 
supply at a market-based price is not an equilibrium 
that evolves spontaneously. 
Club  goods  share  the  public  good’s  characteristic  of 
being non-rival and thus benefiting from reduced costs 
per  user  when  their  numbers  increase.  At  the same 
time, unlike public goods, these goods are excludable 
and each user can thus be made to pay for their share 
of  the  good.  This  reduces  the  risk  of  free-riding, 
something  that  affects  public  goods.  Many  clubs 
(tennis or football clubs, for example) actually require 
a  minimum  number  of  users  in  order  to  be  able  to 
provide the product usefully. After all, if all costs of a 
tennis club were to fall to a single individual, the costs 
would probably be overwhelming.  
Finally, common goods are both non-excludable and 
rival. This is often illustrated with natural resources, 
such  as  fishing  stocks.  As  a  result  of  the  non-
excludability,  individuals  will  in  the  short  term 
overexploit the fishing stock, leading to the ‘tragedy of 
the  commons’  (Olson,  1965).  One  solution  for  this 
problem is a regulatory agency that has the power to 
regulate the usage of this common resource. 
What sort of good is security? 
‘Security’  –  or  to  be  more  precise,  the  commodity, 
measures  and  techniques  to  enhance  the  feeling  of 
being secure – can have the characteristics of a public 
good  or  a  private  good,  as  well  as  a  club  good  or 
common good. The distinction is important as in some 
cases, one would expect an optimal supply of the good 
to occur naturally (private goods), whereas in other 
cases, government intervention may be warranted to 
guarantee sufficient supply (public goods). 
The problem is that security is not monolithic. In fact, 
the provision of security services can have any of the 
features  described  above.  The  services  of  private 
protection  firms,  used  to  protect  either  someone’s 
house  or  a  person  themselves  are  typically  private 
goods. On the other hand, if neighbours work together 
and jointly organize a guard service for their houses, 
this would give the protection service the features of a 
club good. National defence (military) and lighthouses 
(civilian) are typical public goods that provide security 
to individuals in a non-excludable and non-rival way. 
Finally, when interpreting security as a tangible good, 
rather  than  an  intangible  one  (the  ‘feeling  of  being 
secure’)  and  if  there  are  constraints  to  resource 
abundance, security can even be a common good. The 
provision of policing services, for example, is available 
for all citizens (non-excludable), but a given number of 
police  officers  can  only  provide  services  to  a  given 
Table 1 An economists' typology for goods 
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Regional security as a public good has 
both coordination and capacity concerns 
number of individuals. That way, policing services can 
thus be thought of as a common good, in which there is 
rivalry  between  citizens  to  be  able  to  use  this 
particular good. 
Security as a public good 
In  order  to  narrow  down  the  broad  concept  of 
security, Baldwin (1997) formulates seven questions 
that need to be answered: Security for whom? Security 
for  which  values?  How  much  security?  From  what 
threats? By what means? At what cost? In what time 
period? The answers to these questions are pertinent 
in deciding whether one sees security as a public good, 
and  the  subsequent  implications  for  its  provision. 
Some  of  these  questions  require  very  different 
answers depending on how one sees security. A vital 
question is to what degree the state can be expected to 
provide security.  After  all,  private  actors should not 
automatically expect that the state should fulfil each 
demand  for  security,  since  not  all  individuals’ 
demands may be in the public interest. At the same 
time, it should be noted that even when the provision 
of a good is deemed a public task, the state may still 
purchase this (security) good on the free market as a 
private  good  using  public  financing.  With  time, 
technological change may affect the balance between 
public and private security provision. 
Another important concept for the public provision of 
security  is  territoriality.  That  is,  the  provision  of  a 
specific  public  good  by  a  certain  territory  can  have 
spillover effects (positive or negative) across borders. 
As a result, even though the measures may be local or 
national  public  goods,  their  international  non-
excludability may lead to underprovision of the good if 
particular governments feel that the provision of the 
good is not their responsibility. Such a situation would 
call for international coordination so that all benefiting 
countries  share  the  burden  of  good  provision.  The 
sectors most likely to be affected by these problems 
were  identified  by  Sandler  (2007)  as  health, 
environment, knowledge, governance, peace, security 
and  infrastructure  and  he  provides  examples  of 
national, regional and trans-regional goods for these 
sectors. 
A further incentive for the common provision of some 
of these public goods that are not purely national is 
found  in  the  way  many  security  measures  work. 
Traditional analysis argues that the available amount 
of goods is equal to the sum of the separate parts, but 
in the case of security, this is not necessarily the case. 
Indeed, security may be considered as a ‘weakest link’ 
technology,  in  which  the  strength  of  the  security  is 
only  as  good  as  that  of  the  weakest  contributor. 
Typical examples for this would be dykes to prevent 
flooding  or  border  controls.  In  this  case,  it  is  not 
necessarily the size of the group of beneficiaries of a 
particular policy, but the heterogeneity of that group 
that  matters  to  the  coordination  of  goods  provision 
(Sandler 2007). Finally, when there is a threshold in 
security,  goods  only  becomes  productive  if  the 
cumulative quantity provided by all members meets a 
minimum threshold (e.g. equipment to put out a large 
fire), which would require pooling of resources. Thus, 
the maintenance of regional security as a public good 
needs both coordination and appropriate capacity. 
Who is responsible for security provision? 
Security cannot be provided only through private or 
only through public channels. The strength of 
security provision is fully dependent on the 
combination of different methods in order to 
provide  an  optimal  set  of  policies.  For 
example,  public  safety  can  be  provided  by 
local police forces. However, that does not mean that 
individuals should not use private security provisions 
(installing locks on their houses, paying for guarded 
parking) to complement publically provided services. 
When a political decision is made to have the police 
force  focus  on,  for  example,  the  protection  of 
politicians  rather  than  private  individuals,  those 
individuals may want to gather with their neighbours 
to  use  a  club  good  to  enhance  security  by  hiring  a 
security firm to protect their houses. 
This mixture of public, private and club goods is able 
to provide goods at a level that satisfies the needs of 
everyone.  This  way,  an  individual  that  has  an 
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aversion or because they have more to lose) is able to 
privately  purchase  goods  that  make  them  feel  safer 
without burdening those individuals who do not feel 
they  require  the  additional  service.  These  examples 
show that ‘security’ is an ever-changing concept that 
needs to be redefined over time. This is partly due to 
technology shifts, which have led to private security 
firms playing a much larger role now than they did 
before (Krahmann 2008). Furthermore, the transfer of 
some  responsibilities  concerning  security  from  the 
public  to  the  private  sector  is in  line with changing 
preferences in western industrial societies regarding 
the role of the state. 
Policy recommendations 
In this briefing, we give an overview of the debate on 
the typology of security. While security is traditionally 
viewed as a public good provided by the government, 
the role of private providers is increasing. This shift is 
a  result  of  technological  progress,  making  exclusion 
from  some  services  feasible,  as  well  as  changing 
preferences  within  society.  While  at  the  local  or 
individual  level  this  movement  is  pronounced, 
international security is still largely seen as a public 
good in which international coordination is necessary 
to guarantee sufficient provision. This analysis gives a 
useful overview of the features of security provision, 
but  to  give  recommendations  at  the  micro-level  is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  A  deeper 
understanding  of  security  provision  can  only  be 
obtained  through  the  analysis  of  concrete  security 
commodities or security measures. It is important to 
remember  that  the  preferred  mixture  of  public, 
private and club goods is like to depend on a society’s 
development stage. 
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